













MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/11
Creative Success and Network Embeddedness




Creative Success and Network Embeddedness: Explaining Critical Recognition of Film Directors in 
Hollywood, 1900–2010
MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/11  
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne  
July 2014
MPIfG Discussion Paper 
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) 
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2014 by the author
Mark Lutter is head of the Research Group on the Transnational Diffusion of Innovation at the Max Planck 





Go to Publications / Discussion Papers
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies  
Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany
Tel. +49 221 2767-0  
Fax +49 221 2767-555
www.mpifg.de  
info@mpifg.de
Lutter: Creative Success and Network Embeddedness iii
Abstract 
This article analyzes how social network structures affect career success in a project-
based labor market. The literature on team success has shown that teams perform well 
if they integrate both weak and strong ties simultaneously. Applying the literature to 
careers in the creative industries, the study suggests that creative artists are more likely 
to receive critical recognition if they build their careers in both familiar project net-
works and heterogeneous sets of creative conventions. It is argued that familiarity and 
diversity operate as complementary elements in the development of innovative ideas. 
While diversity is important to maximize the flow of new ideas, it needs to be embedded 
within trustworthy and familiar network structures in order to fully develop its creative 
potential. The suggested mechanism is tested by means of full career data of 55,097 film 
directors, covering 478,859 directing jobs in 330,142 film productions during the years 
1900–2010. It is shown that familiarity and diversity explain a considerable part of a 
director’s critical success. Results from interaction effects show that diversity has greater 
effects on critical success if it is socially embedded within familiar social structures. The 
article contributes to the emerging understanding of the role of group processes and 
network structures in explaining individual career success.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel untersucht, wie soziale Netzwerkstrukturen Karriereerfolg auf einem 
projektbasierten Arbeitsmarkt bestimmen. Auf der Grundlage von Forschung zu Team­
erfolg argumentiert der Beitrag, dass Karriereerfolg in Kreativberufen wahrscheinlicher 
wird, wenn Karrieren sich sowohl in vertrauten als auch in diversen, mit heterogenen 
Konventionen ausgestatteten Projektnetzwerken bewegen. Vertrautheit  und Diversität 
wirken als komplementäre Elemente in der Entwicklung innovativer Ideen. Zwar för­
dert das Element der Diversität den optimalen Austausch neuer Ideen, allerdings muss 
es, damit sich sein kreatives Potenzial vollständig entfalten kann, zugleich in vertrau­
ensvollen Netzwerkstrukturen eingebettet sein. Anhand eines vollständigen Karriere­
datensatzes, der Karriereprofile von 55.097 Filmregisseuren in 478.859 Engagements 
und 330.142 Filmproduktionen in den Jahren 1900 bis 2010 einbezieht, wird dieser 
Mechanismus getestet. Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl Vertrautheit als auch Diversität einen 
Großteil des Kritiker­ und Karriereerfolgs der Regisseure erklären. Interaktionseffekte 
zeigen zudem, dass Diversität einen stärkeren Effekt auf künstlerischen Erfolg ausübt, 
wenn sie in vertrauten Strukturen eingebettet ist. Insgesamt erweitert die Studie un­
ser Verständnis davon, wie Gruppen­ und Netzwerkstrukturen individuellen Karriere­
erfolg beeinflussen.
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Creative Success and Network Embeddedness:  
Explaining Critical Recognition of Film Directors  
in Hollywood, 1900–2010
1 Introduction
In recent years, the “winner-take-all” phenomenon has gained increased attention in 
the social sciences (Frank/Cook 1995; Rosen 1981; Adler 1985). The phenomenon de-
scribes a structure in a labor market in which most actors face precarious and uncertain 
career situations, while a handful obtain extreme success. Hollywood is an example: 
A few survive this volatile business and make a very good living; many drop out early. 
Faulkner and Anderson (1987) show that most directors and producers in Hollywood 
make only one or two movies. The same holds true for the critical recognition direc-
tors receive, as Figure 1 illustrates.1 A very small fraction of directors accounts for the 
majority of critical attention in the film business. As can be seen from the figure, about 
5 percent of Hollywood directors receive more than 90 percent of all film awards. 
This structure can be found in nearly all professions within the creative industries. Re-
wards in the art world are heavily skewed toward a minority of superstars who earn the 
highest share of rewards, while most artists face unemployment, underemployment, 
and severe income instabilities (Menger 1999: 545). The heavy skewness in the reward 
distribution among artists has been explained by Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) as a 
demand-driven process in which, once the technical level allows a worldwide distribu-
tion of the artistic product or service at a constant cost, small differences in talent may 
yield large differences in reward. According to Rosen (1981), rational consumers have 
clear preferences for the best talent in the market. The best talent, however, is usu-
ally not substitutable with the second-best: listening to second-tier musicians does not 
substitute the top performer. Reading several bad novels does not add up to the same 
enjoyment of a page-turner. Consumers instead vote for the best product, which creates 
large differences in reward between the best and the second-best performer, although 
“real” differences in talent or quality may be small.
If the talent of a creative artist or the quality of the artistic product is not directly ob-
servable, or if talent is uncertain, disputable, or costly to determine – a common feature 
in many markets (Beckert/Musselin 2013) – rational consumers reduce this uncertainty 
The paper greatly benefited from presentations at several workshops, seminars, and meetings. I thank 
all participants of these events who provided helpful feedback. Specifically, I thank Jens Beckert, Uwe 
Gotzes, Wilhelm Hofmann, Greta Hsu, Philipp Korom, Olivier Pilmis, and Marcin Serafin for helpful 
and constructive comments.
1 For more details on the data see below.
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by looking at the preferences of others (Adler 1985). This rewards artists who are popu-
lar already. Once a certain threshold of popularity is achieved (Granovetter 1978), in-
formation cascades yield the extreme concentration of demand on a very few actors, 
products, or services (Bikhchandani/Hirshleifer/Welch 1992; Banerjee 1992). Herds of 
consumers develop an appetite for the same products, and adapt their decisions ac-
cordingly. What follows is a market in which a few superstars receive great rewards, 
whereas performers with slightly less talent or reputation fail, struggle, or drop out of 
the market. 
These approaches make clear that talent or quality per se is not the most important fac-
tor in success. Talent is certainly important, but not necessarily a sufficient condition 
for the accumulation of success. What matters in the art world are signals for talent. For 
this reason, it makes sense to speak of reputation rather than talent as the driver of suc-
cess (Menger 1999: 557; Becker 1982; White 1993). Reputation indicates a social process 
in the valuation of the artistic product. Artists with good reputations move ahead in 
the business, while “those with only moderate reputations do not, and those with poor 
reputations experience employment difficulties and fail in the market” (Faulkner/An-
derson 1987: 881). Reputation is gained either through commercially successful proj-
ects, or critically successful projects, or both. If artists accumulate successful projects 
over their career, “Matthew effects” (Merton 1968), or cumulative advantages (DiPrete/












Cumulative share of awards
1
Cumulative population proportion
Figure 1 Lorenz curve of the total number of awards per director
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Eirich 2006) greatly increase chances for future successful projects. But what explains 
why some are able to gain reputation while others do not? What factors increase the 
likelihood of building a good reputation over a career?
While the accounts mentioned above explain a large part of the dynamics in the emer-
gence of superstars, the explanation is focused on the demand side of a market, and 
disregards the specific contexts on the supply side, in other words, the social context and 
structures of the potential superstars themselves (see also Lutter 2013b). Both Rosen 
(1981) and Adler (1985) assume talent, or signals of talent, as exogenously given, but do 
not explain where critical recognition and reputation in the market come from in the 
first place. The same holds true for models of diffusion and information cascades; the 
initial signals that trigger diffusion processes remain largely exogenous. 
In this paper, I focus on the social structures and contexts of the careers of creative art-
ists in order to explain why some are able to gain critical attention, while others are not. 
I argue that specific social structures enable the innovativeness and creativity artists 
need to receive critical recognition from their peers and, ultimately, to build up a sig-
nificant reputation. Specifically, I draw on social network theory (especially Uzzi 1997, 
1999; Uzzi/Spiro 2005; Burt 2004, 2005) and cognitive dissonance theory (Stark 2009; 
de Vaan/Stark/Vedres 2013, 2011) in order to explain critical success in the US feature-
film industry. 
To date, most studies have been focused on the performance of creative teams and ex-
plain team-level success (Reagans/McEvily 2003; Reagans/Zuckerman 2001; Uzzi 1997, 
1999; Uzzi/Spiro 2005; Perretti/Negro 2006, 2007; Vedres/Stark 2010; Girard/Stark 
2002; de Vaan/Stark/Vedres 2013). But how networks and cognitive dissonance affect 
individual career success has rarely been studied (on artistic careers generally, however, 
see Cattani/Ferriani 2008; Giuffre 1999; Accominotti 2009; Menger 2009). The litera-
ture on teams suggests that familiar network structures and exposure to heterogeneous, 
diverse creative conventions work as complementary elements in the creation of in-
novative ideas (Uzzi/Spiro 2005). While diversity is important to maximize the flow of 
ideas, it needs to be embedded within trustworthy familiar social structures in order to 
fully develop its creative potential (Stark 2009; de Vaan/Stark/Vedres 2013). I argue that 
being embedded in these creativity-enhancing network structures positively affects in-
dividual career success. Using individual-level career data of 55,097 film directors, I test 
this argument. Controlling for human capital measures, I find that familiarity and di-
versity explain a considerable part of a director’s individual critical success. Interaction 
effects show that diversity has greater effects on critical success if it is socially embedded 
within familiar social structures. 
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2 Theory
The social embeddedness of economic action (Granovetter 1985) has been a landmark 
concept in the study of markets, organizations, and economic life. However, the dem-
onstration that market processes are structured by social networks is still an ongoing 
empirical and theoretical challenge. We still do not know what specific types of social 
structures affect market outcomes, nor exactly when and how they do so. 
In order to explain success among creative artists, the literature on team success, social 
networks, and social capital is of particular importance (Portes 1998; Adler/Kwon 2002; 
Burt 2005; Coleman 1988, 1990; Lin 2001; Granovetter 1973). Within this literature, 
there are two basic views on how social structures affect success (Burt 2001). One goes 
back to Coleman’s thoughts on social capital; the other is rooted in Granovetter’s weak-
ties theory and Burt’s structural-holes approach. From these viewpoints, “success” is a 
function of either network density or network diversity.
The first approach views dense networks as a creator of social capital and a facilitator 
of performance (Coleman 1988). Dense networks are social structures in which each 
network member is familiar to all or most other members in the network. For instance, 
within a film production team, members form a dense network if many in the team 
know each other from past collaborations. The more members know each other, the 
more familiar the team will be. 
This form of social embeddedness affects individual performance in two ways (Burt 
2001: 37). First, familiar networks ease the exchange of information and the transfer 
of knowledge. This is especially true with regard to reliable or important information, 
knowledge of high complexity or quality (Reagans/McEvily 2003; Reagans/Zuckerman 
2001; Rost 2011; Podolny/Baron 1997; Hansen 1999; Moran 2005: 1147; Smith/Collins/
Clark 2005). The exchange of knowledge is fostered because members in dense net-
works develop trust through their repeated interaction. They establish reciprocal group 
norms that impose a set of obligations and expectations on the individual group mem-
ber (Coleman 1988: 107). This makes cooperative behavior more likely, which positively 
affects performance. 
Second, familiar networks enhance the coordination capacity of the team (Reagans/
Zuckerman 2001; O’Reilly/Caldwell/Barnett 1989). Especially in environments with 
high market uncertainty, market actors stabilize coordination processes by relying on 
those with whom they have collaborated in the past (Podolny 1994; Geertz 1978: 30; 
Beckert 1996). Project-based labor markets such as the film industry are characterized 
by high uncertainty in several ways (Faulkner/Anderson 1987: 884): work is innovative, 
non-routine, flexible, and creative. At the same time, investments in capital are high, 
but market outcomes are economically risky, uncertain, and hard to predict, largely due 
to unstable demand patterns. Reliance on prior collaborators in team construction is a 
way to reduce uncertainties in the market.
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It is easier to coordinate and to adjust action and to perform complex tasks if actors 
know and trust each other (Podolny/Baron 1997: 676). Familiar networks convey dis-
tinct frames of action within which their members can concentrate on their tasks and 
improve their performance. By contrast, unfamiliar, low-density networks create un-
clear, contradictory, or multiple frames of action within which coordination and com-
munication become much more demanding. 
Research shows that the positive effect of familiarity on performance is reversed when 
network density becomes too strong (Uzzi/Spiro 2005; Uzzi 1997, 1999; Giuffre 1999), 
which speaks against Coleman’s positive view on dense networks. For instance, in their 
study of Broadway musicals, Uzzi and Spiro (2005) demonstrate a nonlinear, inverse 
u-shaped relationship between the artistic success of musicals and the network den-
sity of musical team members. Performance and success increase with network density 
up to a certain level. After this threshold, performance decreases with higher levels of 
embeddedness (for further examples, see Uzzi 1997, 1999; Giuffre 1999). In the case of 
high density, both coordination capacity and information flow are maximized, but this 
comes at the expense of reduced ability to come up with innovative ideas. The reason 
is that within high-density networks, the ideas that are shared become repetitive and 
redundant. They originate from the same people, who share similar demographic back-
grounds, and have potentially been exposed to related experiences. High-density teams 
hold identical standards of knowledge. They agree on the same artistic or creative con-
ventions. While these resources can be well coordinated because team members trust 
and know each other, the creative output is far from being novel, groundbreaking, or 
innovative. Hence, overly high-density teams gain less critical attention and success, 
which, if associated with these teams, becomes a liability for an artist’s career success.
While overly dense teams might be beneficial in some contexts,2 they are especially 
harmful in the context of creative work. The creative industries are forced to create 
permanent novelty. A movie earns critical recognition if it delivers a constant flow of 
novel experiences; this is what Hutter (2011) terms “infinite surprises” as a generator 
of “praise value.” While a successful creative product undoubtedly uses and builds on 
conventions, it twists or combines these in an innovative way into new forms (Becker 
1982: 63). Generating newness, however, becomes difficult in a context of high-density 
networks in which redundant information constrains innovative ideas.
2 In his classic paper, Coleman mentions the case of high school dropouts, the likelihood of which 
is much lower within dense family networks (Coleman 1988: 109–116). Still, as Burt (2001: 46) 
notes, it is debatable whether or not mere prevention from dropping out of school forms a good 
criterion for success. 
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In sum, this discussion suggests that while familiarity among team members increases 
creative performance and potential success in an art world, high levels of density and 
cohesion can potentially undermine the innovative flow of ideas. This should have di-
rect effects on the career paths of creative artists, depending on whether they are more 
often associated with familiar teams, or with cohesive, overly familiar teams: 
H1: Directors who build their career within familiar collaboration networks achieve higher 
rates of critical success.
H2: Directors who build their career within cohesive collaboration networks show lower 
rates of critical success.
The second view argues that success and performance are positively affected by ex-
posure to heterogeneous, diverse sets of people, information, ideas, and cultures. This 
viewpoint goes back to Burt’s concept of structural holes (Burt 1992; Burt 2001; Burt 
2005), which itself starts with Granovetter’s (1973) strength of weak ties hypothesis. In 
addition, it has origins in concepts such as Lévi-Strauss’ notion of “bricolage” (Lévi-
Strauss 1966) as well as March and Olson’s organizational theory of exploration, ambi-
guity, and choice (March 1991; March/Olsen 1966).
The basic argument is that actors in a brokerage position who bridge two or more oth-
erwise unconnected and diverse networks gain important competitive advantages over 
those located within rather than between groups (Burt 1992). Moreover, brokers enrich 
both worlds by bringing new ideas into a core group. Brokers are hence in a better posi-
tion to create new ideas and to produce innovative outcomes (Burt 2004). 
The positive effect of brokerage has been demonstrated in empirical research. For in-
stance, Giuffre (1999) shows in her study of New York fine art photographers that those 
who are embedded in a loosely connected network of ties between artists and galleries 
obtain more critical success than those who are either not connected at all – and strug-
gling to survive – or those who have a few strong connections to galleries.
Being embedded in a diverse set of network relations also serves as a protection against 
career failure. This is especially true for freelancers or project workers who have to rely 
on a large net of customers who might call for their services on future occasions (Becker 
1982: 86), for job seekers who extend their search routes through the non-redundant 
information of weak-tie connections (Granovetter 1974; Godechot/Mariot 2004), or 
for disadvantaged labor market groups such as women, who benefit from a diverse set 
of job-relevant relationships (Lutter 2013a).
The approach also applies at the team level: If a team is designed in such a way that it 
recruits members from different disciplines, or with different creative or cultural back-
grounds, this increases the chances that different ideas will be explored and combined 
in innovative directions (March 1991; Perretti/Negro 2006, 2007). For instance, most 
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scientific knowledge production happens in teams nowadays, and scholarly papers pub-
lished by more than one author are more likely to be successful (Wuchty/Jones/Uzzi 
2007), especially if co-authorship consists of cross-institutional (Abramo/D’Angelo/
Solazzi 2011: 630) or cross-national (He/Geng/Campbell-Hunt 2009) collaboration. A 
team’s productivity and success are enhanced when authors are included who are likely 
to bring in diverse ideas.
Hence, a career that moves through diverse cultural structures is more likely to be cre-
atively successful. Artists exposed to larger sets of different genre conventions are like-
ly to create new, innovative ideas by combining these conventions. In addition, Stark 
(2009: 17) emphasizes in his research that creativity requires both diverse informational 
structures and familiar settings within which people trust and know each other. Build-
ing on Burt’s notion of structural holes, this is what Vedres and Stark (Vedres/Stark 
2010) call “structural folds” – the simultaneous organization of familiar and diverse 
structures that increase innovativeness (also see: Girard/Stark 2002; Beunza/Stark 2003, 
2004; de Vaan/Vedres/Stark 2011). 
Putting diversity into familiar structures enhances creativity because taken-for-granted 
knowledge must be re-evaluated. In a diverse team context, different conventions en-
gage in competition with each other, collide, and grind against one another. This leads 
to the redefinition of standards and to new combinations. What follows are creative 
mutations that are the source of newness (Stark 2009: 18–19). This is what Uzzi and 
Spiro (2005) describe in their paper on Broadway musicals (see also Uzzi 1999), but do 
not directly test. In their example of the collaboration of two musical producers draw-
ing on different conventions, Uzzi and Spiro note: 
Together they creatively combined the musical and lyrical conventions of the whimsical lovers 
with those of the doomed lovers […]. This risky creative gamble was supported by their close 
personal relationship, which had formed two years earlier during Oklahoma (1943), their first 
musical together. In this way, the distribution of different conventions and personal relations 
around an art can inspire creativity either by revealing previously unseen connections in mate-
rial or by necessitating that an innovative solution be found that enables a synthesis of different 
material. (Uzzi/Spiro 2005: 461–462)
In sum, exposure to a diverse set of conventions increases the likelihood that creative 
artists will produce creative, innovative products which gain critical recognition. In ad-
dition, the effect of diversity on critical success is increased if diversity is organized 
within familiar social structures.
H3: Directors who build their career within diverse and heterogeneous network structures 
show higher rates of critical success.
H4: The diversity effect increases with familiarity: Directors achieve highest rates of critical 
success if they build their career within both diverse and familiar network structures.
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3 Data and method
I test the proposed hypotheses using full career path data from 55,097 film directors 
who at least once during their careers directed a US feature film. I focus on film direc-
tors because directors are the main figures responsible for the creative and artistic outlet 
of a production, as opposed to the producers who are mainly in charge of its financial 
aspects (Baker/Faulkner 1991). Specifically, a director is responsible for the artistic and 
creative vision of a production. Movies are identified with their director; he or she de-
fines a movie’s specific “signature.” At the same time, directors draw reputation and 
critical acclaim from their production. The director is also important in bringing to-
gether and managing the film crew, and “plays a critical role in coordinating the efforts 
of other crewmembers, solving possible conflicts, and facilitating internal cohesion and 
communication” (Cattani et al. 2013: 9).
The data come from the IMDB, an internet encyclopedia that lists almost every fea-
ture film production ever released, including credit information on all actors and staff 
members (actors and actresses, producers, directors, cinematographers, editors, and so 
on). Currently, the database contains data on about two million productions and four 
million individuals.3 
Each director’s career path starts with his/her first movie production and ends with the 
last entry. This creates an unbalanced panel dataset in which the number of observa-
tions per director equals the total number of productions over a whole career. I include 
a director’s full career profile if the director at least once directed a US feature-film pro-
duction. This ensures that I capture the US labor market of film directors in its entirety.4 
Feature films are movies that were shown in a movie theater, and usually released at a 
film festival. I do not include TV productions, TV series, and video-only movies, such 
as pornographic films. The final sample includes a total of 478,859 directing jobs by 
55,097 directors in 330,142 films between 1900 and 2010.
3 The IMBD data are managed by editors who update the data regularly and ensure their valid-
ity. Film fans support them by reporting errors. Even actors themselves, or other members of a 
film crew, are allowed to provide information to the IMDB editors. Its good data validity is also 
known to social science research; several influential studies obtained important sociological in-
sights using these data (Hsu 2006; Hsu/Hannan/Koçak 2009; Rossman/Esparza/Bonacich 2010; 
Zuckerman et al. 2003; Zuckerman/Kim 2003).
4 The aim of this procedure is to cover the full US labor market of film directors. This represents 
the best solution of constructing the sample. Other inclusion criteria produce a biased sample. 
For instance, if I just include directors “born in the US,” an attribute in the IMDB, the sample 
will be biased by success. The reason is that there is missing data on this criterion for many of 
the unknown directors. Hence, this procedure produces a sample in which only famous direc-
tors are included. Since our dependent variable is a measure of success, estimates would be 
biased. 
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Dependent variable
I use the cumulative number of awards as a measure of critical success. I include all 
nominations and awards a director received at an important festival, either personally 
(for example, in a category such as “best director”) or for the movie (that is, if the film 
as a whole was nominated or won an award in a category such as “best film”). I record 
the data from the 44 US-wide and internationally most acknowledged festivals (Ge-
bert 1996; O’Neil 2001; Gemser/Leenders/Wijnberg 2008). This includes the fourteen 
high-ranking US film awards (such as the Academy Awards or the Directors Guild of 
America Awards), the fourteen top international film festivals (such as Berlin, Cannes, 
or Venice), plus sixteen second-ranked “B” festivals (such as European Film Awards, 
London Film Festival, or Toronto International Film Festival), as shown in Table A1 
in the appendix. Each award enters the equation with an equal weight, for which there 
is a reason: First, there is no theory justification on how to appropriately weight each 
single award. Second, the film industry creates a “natural” weight: Those directors who 
receive the most prestigious awards (like the Oscar) are likely to receive many of the 
second-tier awards. In that sense, prestigious awards do not need to be weighted higher, 
because directors will receive more awards anyway. 
Predictors
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics of all variables used for the analysis. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 relate critical success to the type of embeddedness in the social structure of the labor 
market. To test H1, I use the variable familiarity in order to estimate the extent to which 
a director works in teams consisting of people knowing (and possibly trusting) each 
other, based on the intensity of past collaborations. Familiarity is a way to measure net-
work density among team members. The measure goes back to Newman (2001), and has 
been used in a similar fashion by Reagans et al. (2005), de Vaan et al. (2011), Cattani et 
al. (2013) and Lutter (2013a). I adopt this measure from de Vaan et al. (2011: 13), but 
modify it for the individual career level. The variable is a cumulated standardized average 
of dyadic past collaborations for each film team over a director’s career. It is zero if there 
is no repeated collaboration among any of the team members in any team the director 
has been working with, and it takes on positive values if there is prior collaboration. The 
higher its values, the higher the degree to which a director works in teams in which team 
members know each other and share experience from past productions. The appendix 
provides information on the technical details of this measure as well as on the predictors 
discussed below.
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While familiarity represents the strength of past collaboration within a team, it does 
not measure any sort of density that goes beyond an average quantity of prior relation-
ships between pairs of team members. In order to measure the degree to which a team 
consists not only of familiar ties, but also of stronger, cohesive ties, I use three different 
approaches.
First, I use a modified version of a team-based cohesion variable that was developed 
by de Vaan et al. (2011: 13–14). Specifically, I apply their team-based measure to the 
individual level by accumulating over all entries of a director’s career. At the team level, 
the quantity captures the degree of cohesion of a present team, derived from past col-
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of all variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Cumulative number of awards 5.31 21.68 0 659
Familiarity 77.71 810.08 0 22842.56
Cohesion 318.16 1866.80 0 51772.24
Vertical strong ties 194.63 1300.15 0 21134.05
Horizontal strong ties 98.21 598.92 0 11290.53
Degree of exploration 4.67 6.66 0 99.26
Genre spanning 115.47 288.17 0 4312
New genre 12.03 14.87 0 186
Genre diversity 12.63 24.96 0 359.55
Age 41.91 10.80 3 86
Female 0.09 0.29 0 1
Origin USA 0.40 0.49 0 1
Origin UK 0.03 0.17 0 1
Origin Germany 0.02 0.13 0 1
Origin France 0.02 0.15 0 1
Origin Italy 0.02 0.14 0 1
Prior success 2.71 17.33 0 659
Years in business 11.26 11.45 0 85
Job experience 56.92 137.07 1 2268
Has been producer 18.01 115.13 0 2209
Has been actor 24.17 54.60 0 595
Has been writer 6.21 19.12 0 337
International visibility 3.39 9.53 0 199
Major titles 54.75 135.35 0 2209
Sequels 1.32 8.32 0 287
Novels 3.35 6.78 0 88
Titles in English 38.26 99.50 0 1476
Titles in Spanish 1.49 9.29 0 231
Titles in German 0.99 6.56 0 210
Titles in French 1.32 6.58 0 171
Titles in Italian 0.90 6.23 0 181
Production country USA 49.38 136.20 0 2209
Production country Germany 0.74 6.12 0 174
Production country France 1.53 9.40 0 359
Production country Italy 1.06 7.10 0 191
Crew size 27.78 31.11 1 1311
Team human capital 35.16 67.16 0 2266
Team star power 2.79 5.94 0 432
Hierarchical layer structure 3.21 3.37 0 58
Time 43.04 35.67 1 111
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laborations of interconnected subgroups of at least three persons. For instance, if three 
crew members collaborated in a prior production and reassemble in a later movie, this 
production is more cohesive because a full clique rather than a dyadic tie collaborates 
again. The variable takes on positive values, and the higher the values, the more recur-
ring cohesive structures from the past constitute a present team. If instead no clique of 
former collaboration exists within a team, the measure takes the value 0. I use the cumu-
lative over a director’s career path in order to capture past associations in cohesive teams.
Second, I create two measures of cohesion that refer directly to the position of the direc-
tor (taken from: Delmestri/Montanari/Usai 2005: 990). The first is the cumulative of a 
director’s horizontal strong ties. For each time point t in a career of director, I accumu-
late the number of times he or she directed a film with the same producer. In the same 
way, the variable vertical strong ties accumulates the number of times a director has been 
collaborating with the same actor or actress in present team. While the first variable 
measures strong-tie relationships on the managerial side of a production, taking hori-
zontal ties between the director and the producers into account, the second quantifies 
strong ties vertically, between directors and actors, and hence relates to the artistic level 
of a production. Higher values of both variables indicate that a director tends to build a 
career within closer tie structures.
In order to test H3 and H4, I construct a total of four measures that capture different 
aspects of diversity. The first variable is the degree of exploration within each production, 
counted as the proportion of newcomers per team, and accumulated over a director’s 
career. In line with March (1991) as well as Perretti and Negro (2006), I suppose that 
the more newcomers enter a team, the higher the extent to which fresh, uncommon, or 
progressive perspectives and ideas are being explored within a production. The more 
a director has been exposed to newcomer exploration within teams, the more likely a 
director’s critical success. 
The next three variables consider the director’s individual experience with different 
artistic categories. Every film in the database is classified by a combination of up to 
28 genre categories, such as drama, comedy, sci-fi, or crime. For instance, Kubrick’s 
“Spartacus” (1960) carries the genre codes action, adventure, and biography, whereas 
“A Clockwork Orange” (1971) has the labels crime, drama, and sci-fi.
The variable genre spanning counts and accumulates at each point in time the absolute 
number of different genre categories a director has been exposed to over his/her career 
(see Hsu 2006). The more a director manages to cover different artistic categories, the 
broader his/her experience is with diverse artistic conventions, standards, and cultures 
(Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006; Hsu/Hannan/Koçak 2009). 
The variable new genre accumulates over time the number of a director’s movies in 
which the attached genre categories constitute a completely new combination of genres 
for the respective director; in other words, the combination did not previously occur 
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in the director’s career path. This variable measures a director’s propensity to engage 
in new categories, which displays personal tendencies to leave familiar paths and to 
move to unknown artistic territory. While genre spanning measures the extent to which 
a director has been exposed to diverse genre categories, cultures, and conventions, new 
genre takes into account the extent to which a director actively pursues this exposure.
Finally, the variable genre diversity measures the average genre distance between all 
members of a film crew. Again, I adopt this measure from de Vaan et al. (2011: 11–12) 
and adapt it to the individual level by accumulating  it over a director’s full career path. 
Genre diversity at the team level is based on the individual genre histories each team 
member brings in from all prior productions. The measure is based on Jaffe’s renowned 
dissimilarity index (Jaffe 1986) and has been used in a similar way by Rodan and Ga-
lunic (2004), Lutter (2013a), Phelps (2010), and de Vaan et al. (2011). In the technical 
appendix, I describe the construction in detail. At the team level, the measure is 0 if 
all members in a team share exactly the same genre history. It takes on positive values 
if members in a team differ in their genre histories. The cumulative of this variable 
quantifies the extent to which a director compiles, directs, and works within teams that 
are either more homogenous or more heterogeneous with regard to genre experiences. 
The higher the value of this measure, the more diverse the director’s career path is with 
regard to genre diversity of prior teams. 
Covariates
In order to rule out possible effects on the dependent variable, I use several controls at 
the individual and team level. First, I use a set of director-specific socio-demographic 
controls. This comprises age, measured in years, female,5 and country of origin (five 
dummies for USA, UK, France, Germany, and Italy). 
Second, I include a number of human capital measures to control for talent, experience, 
and seniority, as well as the human capital qualities of the team. Prior success. This vari-
able counts the number of awards a director received prior to the current production. 
Years in business. This is the number of years the director has remained, or “survived,” 
in the film business, counted from the director’s first to last production at time point t. 
General job experience. This is the total number of movies the director has made by time 
t. Specific experience: Has been producer/actor/writer. These three variables count at each 
time point t the number of times the director has worked as producer, actor, or writer. 
Changing role types is a signal for a broader range of accumulated skills. This displays 
5 The IMDB only provides the gender of actors and actresses. For directors, I had to compute 
this variable by automatically imputing gender information based on lists of female and male 
first names. This worked for about 73 percent of individuals in the data. For the remaining 27 
percent, about 15,000 individuals, the gender information was coded manually.
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more stable and successful careers (Baker/Faulkner 1991), and is likely to affect critical 
success. International visibility. This variable measures the international visibility and 
experience level of the director, which I assume should affect critical success. For each of 
a director’s film productions, the measure counts and accumulates over time the num-
ber of production countries involved in the film and the number of languages in which 
the title was released. The home country or language is excluded from this count. Major 
titles. The accumulated number of a director’s titles either produced or distributed by a 
major company. As opposed to independent productions, majors have substantial bud-
gets and attract larger audiences through wider distribution channels and effective mar-
keting. Sequels. This is the director’s cumulative number of sequel productions. Sequels 
build on the popularity of their forerunner. Sequels often receive substantial box-office 
returns. Novels. Accordingly, this is the cumulative number of productions that were 
based on a novel. On average, titles based on a novel are more successful than movies 
based on previously unknown scripts. Titles in English/ Spanish/ German/ French/ Ital-
ian. These five variables count the number of English-language productions (Spanish-, 
German-, French-, Italian-language, respectively) the director has been involved in. 
Production country USA/Germany/France/Italy. Similarly, these four variables count the 
number of titles that were produced in the USA (UK, Germany, France, Italy, respective-
ly). Both sets of variables account for possible heterogeneity due to language or country 
of production, which might differently affect the likelihood of receiving awards. Crew 
size. Since I do not have a direct measure for budget or box-office returns, I control for 
the number of members in a production. According to Rossman et al. (2010), this can 
be seen as an approximation of budget and, eventually, box-office returns. Productions 
with larger teams generally have higher production costs; at the same time, costly mov-
ies usually do well at the box office (though the correlation is not perfect). Team human 
capital. This variable measures the extent to which a team consists of experienced mem-
bers. It accumulates the average experience level of the team for each film production, 
based on the total number of each team member’s movie productions up to time point 
t, divided by crew size. The higher the value of this variable, the more experienced the 
team is. Team star power. This measure calculates the average number of awards each 
team member had received until the current production. Hence, it measures the extent 
to which the team consists of stars. Hierarchical layer structure. This variable counts the 
total number of producers and directors for each production. Previous research shows 
that the more co-directors or co-producers are involved, the higher the constraints on 
the creative vision of a director, which might have a negative effect on critical success 
(Perretti/Negro 2006: 767). 
Analytical strategy
The dependent variable is a count variable, so I use count modeling to take advantage of 
the data effectively. Specifically, I employ random- and fixed-effects negative binomial 
regression models to account for overdispersion and to fully exploit the panel structure 
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in the data.6 Since the dependent variable has a large amount of zeros, this might sug-
gest the use of zero-inflated models. However, it should be noted that the zeros are com-
pletely “true” in the sense that each individual has a positive chance to receive an award. 
There are no “excess zeros,” which would occur if some individuals have no chance of 
receiving an award (in which case, a zero-inflated model would be the appropriate tool) 
(Cameron/Trivedi 1998: 123). 
Count data are sometimes modeled through OLS regression using log transformation 
of the dependent variable. Such an approach, however, is also not appropriate in this 
case since the log transformation would reduce the dispersion in the dependent count 
variable and it is precisely this dispersion in which this study is interested. That success 
across individuals is highly scattered is a natural feature of this labor market, and log-
ging the dependent variable would lessen the ability to estimate this winner-take-all 
characteristic.
This is also the reason why I mainly focus on a random-effects approach rather than 
fixed-effects because fixed-effects models would drop all time-invariant variables as 
well as all directors who appeared in just one production, in addition to those without 
variation on the dependent variable (applies in total to about 75 percent of all direc-
tors). However, since a fixed-effects model allows stricter tests on causality due to its 
“within logic” in the interpretation of coefficients, and since fixed-effects estimations 
are generally better at ruling out possible endogeneity problems, I additionally run and 
present the results of a fixed-effects regression on the full model (see results section 
below, Table 2, Model 6). 
Since the timeframe of the study covers more than a century, there might be general 
time trends affecting both the dependent as well as the independent variables. To ac-
count for such an unobserved heterogeneity due to time, the full model includes the 
logged number of years from 1900. Controlling for time is also important because many 
awards are relatively new and were established after 1970.7 Thus, chances of receiving an 
award might increase with time, though probably at a marginally diminishing rate. In 
addition to time, all models control for possible heterogeneity due to genre. Some film 
genres might impart a greater chance of receiving awards. Therefore, I include dummies 
for all of the 28 genres. To control for skewness and diminishing marginal effects, most 
predictors enter the regression log-transformed. 
6 Likelihood ratio test strongly suggest that the usage of negative binomial models is superior to 
the Poisson model. All test results can be made available upon request.
7 I tested several dummies for certain time periods (silent era, studio-system era). Results do not 
change if I include these other specifications of time. However, since I have no theoretical justi-
fication for how to define the timeframes, it seems to be a better solution to use the logged time 
counter. 
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4 Results
Table 2 displays the regression results. Model 1 is a baseline model that starts with the 
first set of control variables, the socio-demographic background variables, and the indi-
vidual-level human capital measures. Model 2 enters the main predictors. Model 3 adds 
the regional controls such as language and country of production. Model 4 includes the 
remaining team-level controls, and Model 5 controls for the time trend. Model 6 repli-
cates the full model using a fixed-effects rather than random-effects regression. All six 
models include the 28 genre dummies. 
The control variables, to begin with, show that critical success is associated with higher 
age, being female, prior success, years in the business, being experienced as a producer 
(but not as an actor or writer), having international visibility, having produced titles in 
the English language and produced in the United States, with a larger budget, with less 
team seniority, but with higher team star power. Producing more major titles or sequels 
reduces critical success, whereas scripts based on novels increase critical attention. The 
fact that women have higher chances of receiving awards is an interesting ancillary find-
ing, which, as it is not the focus here, might be of interest for future studies (but see 
Lutter 2012).
The main predictors largely confirm the proposed hypotheses. As can be seen from the 
familiarity variable, H1 is supported. The more a director builds a career within familiar 
affiliation networks, the more likely it is that he or she will achieve higher rates of criti-
cal success. In contrast, if the affiliation becomes too strong, this is detrimental for cre-
ativity and innovativeness. Cohesive structures impart strong negative effects on critical 
success. This is shown by the negative coefficients of cohesion and vertical strong ties. 
It seems that especially the density among the “creative” members negatively affects 
critical success, because the coefficient of horizontal strong ties – that is, strong ties be-
tween director and producer – positively affects critical success. Relationships between 
the main “heads” of a production are crucial for the trust that is needed for creativity 
and innovativeness in output. Hence, H2 is supported for the “creative” domain, but 
not necessarily with regard to the business side of a production – which makes sense in 
light of the theory assumptions on the relation between information sharing and the 
generation of creative ideas.
The diversity measures, too, point in the expected direction: The more a career is built 
within diverse and heterogeneous structures, the better this is for creative success. This 
is true for the individual attachment to different genre cultures, as shown by the genre-
spanning variable, as well as for the individual tendency to explore new creative fields, 
as shown by the new-genre variable. The association is also supported for genre diver-
sity. These coefficients show that the diverse environments in which directors build 
their careers have strong effects on a director’s likelihood of receiving critical attention 
and success. The only exception is the degree of exploration, which is positive in the first 
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Table 2 Random and fixed-effects negative binomial regression on cumulative number of awards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (ln) 0.563* 0.408* 0.377* 0.188* 0.205* 0.296*
(47.971) (33.210) (31.775) (16.789) (18.175) (25.942)
Female 0.471* 0.556* 0.491* 0.429* 0.453* (n.i.)
(21.693) (24.842) (21.709) (18.239) (19.120)
Origin USA 0.068* –0.073* –0.217* –0.197* –0.224* (n.i.)
(4.579) (–4.881) (–13.256) (–11.819) (–13.324)
Origin UK –0.217* –0.304* –0.251* –0.176* –0.173* (n.i.)
(–5.373) (–7.574) (–5.782) (–3.912) (–3.808)
Origin Germany –0.320* 0.297* 0.525* 0.512* 0.478* (n.i.)
(–6.382) (5.716) (10.368) (9.548) (8.731)
Origin France –0.365* –0.038 0.238* 0.089 0.043 (n.i.)
(–8.409) (–0.862) (5.188) (1.936) (0.936)
Origin Italy 0.296* 0.873* 1.332* 1.139* 1.130* (n.i.)
(4.985) (13.276) (18.008) (15.785) (15.362)
Prior success (ln) 0.037* 0.033* 0.033* 0.026* 0.025* 0.025*
(48.349) (44.991) (46.313) (40.086) (38.423) (38.506)
Years in business (ln) 0.273* 0.312* 0.297* 0.235* 0.248* 0.202*
(82.778) (89.599) (87.517) (73.381) (75.531) (62.220)
Job experience (ln) 0.020 –1.300* –1.420* –0.964* –1.058* –0.983*
(1.974) (–59.646) (–63.665) (–43.635) (–47.061) (–43.835)
Has been producer (ln) 0.076* 0.029* 0.013* –0.006 0.001 –0.003
(23.108) (8.272) (3.762) (–1.808) (0.197) (–0.935)
Has been actor (ln) –0.124* –0.073* –0.036* –0.048* –0.036* –0.067*
(–28.744) (–14.001) (–6.890) (–9.427) (–7.045) (–13.067)
Has been writer (ln) –0.039* –0.037* –0.022* –0.006 0.001 0.010
(–9.007) (–8.549) (–5.034) (–1.382) (0.334) (2.353)
International visibility (ln) 0.435* 0.336* 0.496* 0.392* 0.394* 0.391*
(99.252) (73.572) (85.049) (71.006) (71.536) (70.573)
Major titles (ln) –0.085* –0.170* –0.015 0.041* 0.085* 0.134*
(–10.603) (–20.558) (–1.718) (4.782) (9.549) (14.743)
Sequels (ln) 0.130* 0.012 –0.008 –0.007 –0.008 –0.008
(32.831) (2.853) (–1.974) (–1.706) (–2.069) (–1.967)
Novels (ln) 0.508* 0.376* 0.393* 0.290* 0.273* 0.282*
(86.949) (62.027) (65.883) (51.532) (48.162) (49.516)
Familiarity (ln) 0.132* 0.157* 0.078* 0.076* 0.108*
  (13.823) (15.867) (8.136) (7.881) (11.126)
Cohesion (ln)  –0.036* –0.049* –0.049* –0.053* –0.060*
(–5.102) (–6.842) (–6.892) (–7.452) (–8.297)
Vertical strong ties (ln) –0.111* –0.084* –0.053* –0.060* –0.050*
(–21.382) (–15.723) (–10.431) (–11.867) (–9.780)
Horizontal strong ties (ln) 0.060* 0.077* 0.071* 0.065* 0.062*
(15.063) (18.853) (17.896) (16.257) (15.630)
Degree of exploration (ln) 0.010 0.124* –0.126* –0.079* –0.025
(0.750) (9.177) (–9.630) (–5.933) (–1.851)
Genre spanning (ln) 0.787* 0.626* 0.542* 0.536* 0.428*
(45.916) (34.925) (31.318) (31.007) (24.633)
New genre (ln) 0.603* 0.449* 0.317* 0.322* 0.340*
(39.884) (29.774) (21.831) (22.200) (23.226)
Genre diversity (ln) 0.473* 0.525* 0.659* 0.699* 0.628*
    (20.242) (21.178) (27.021) (28.521) (25.517)
Titles in English (ln)   0.093* 0.050* 0.057* 0.043*
(9.333) (4.988) (5.751) (4.291)
Titles in Spanish (ln) –0.044* –0.050* –0.043* –0.049*
(–9.350) (–11.096) (–9.536) (–10.768)
Titles in German (ln) –0.053* –0.058* –0.063* –0.058*
(–10.770) (–12.291) (–13.470) (–12.430)
Titles in French (ln) 0.074* 0.064* 0.065* 0.063*
(13.735) (12.632) (12.876) (12.385)
Titles in Italian (ln) –0.034* –0.029* –0.028* –0.013
(–6.239) (–5.468) (–5.278) (–2.437)
(continued on next page)
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Production country USA (ln) 0.081* 0.074* 0.083* 0.070*
(11.055) (10.037) (11.337) (9.604)
Production country Germany (ln) –0.211* –0.160* –0.132* –0.151*
(–57.623) (–45.191) (–35.469) (–40.252)
Production country France (ln) –0.203* –0.148* –0.142* –0.139*
(–38.237) (–29.243) (–28.146) (–27.624)
Production country Italy (ln) –0.067* –0.070* –0.077* –0.071*
(–12.315) (–13.419) (–14.840) (–13.795)
Crew size (ln) 0.037* 0.035* 0.032*
(18.458) (17.396) (15.653)
Team human capital (ln) –0.265* –0.260* –0.264*
(–92.039) (–91.011) (–91.888)
Team star power (ln) 0.335* 0.333* 0.329*
(146.472) (146.609) (144.125)
Hierarchical layer structure (ln) –0.032* –0.032* –0.030*
(–13.542) (–13.736) (–12.409)
Time (ln) 0.058* 0.037*
(23.063) (14.291)
Constant –2.332* –2.623* –2.294* –1.459* –1.714* –1.776*
(–55.640) (–55.259) (–48.743) (–31.901) (–36.213) (–38.010)
Ln(r) –0.141* –0.092* –0.052* 0.065* 0.061* 
(–10.844) (–6.972) (–3.896) (4.804) (4.475)
Ln(s) –2.136* –2.116* –2.160* –2.088* –2.067*
(–141.192) (–138.973) (–141.559) (–135.730) (–134.260)
Genre dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood –464141.963 –459412.467 –455512.965 –444636.205 –444369.087 –380763.899
Chi2 332506.514 345351.941 355175.429 407514.604 411221.269 409884.367
AIC 928379.927 918936.934 911155.930 889410.411 888878.174 761651.798
BIC 928911.726 919557.367 911876.076 890174.873 889653.715 762291.844
N (directors) 55097 55097 55097 55097 55097 8503
N (engagements) 478859 478859 478859 478859 478859 224880
Note: Random-effects (Models 1–5) and fixed-effects (Model 6) negative binomial regressions; t statistics in parentheses; 
* p < 0.001 (two-sided tests); n.i. = not identifiable within fixed-effects regression; ln=logged variables.
Table 2 (continued)
models, but becomes negative after I control for team human capital and star power 
(and is insignificant in the fixed-effects model). Despite this ambiguity, H3 is well sup-
ported by three out of four diversity measures. 
Regarding the robustness of the findings, the results remain absolutely stable within 
the fixed-effects estimation in Model 6. This model is only capable of estimating time-
variant variables, and therefore drops all data with no time-variation as well as all direc-
tors with no variation on the outcome variable. For the remaining 8,503 directors, the 
coefficients offer a better causal interpretation and show how changes in the predictor 
variables directly affect outcomes within a director’s career. As the table shows, the re-
sults also confirm this stricter causal test on the data.
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H4, finally, makes an interaction argument: The familiarity effect should become stron-
ger with increasing diversity. Figure 2 tests this assumption. The figure plots the inter-
action effects of the familiarity variable and the four diversity measures. Each panel in 
the graph shows one interaction, each based on the full regression model, including the 
predictors, the interaction term, and all controls.8
Each graph in the figure plots the model-based predicted number of awards (y-axis) 
for different values of the familiarity variable, based on the full covariate model, as 
a function of the respective diversity measure (x-axis). All other controls are fixed at 
their means. Each line in the graphs represents the effect of the familiarity variable for a 
specific value and shows how the expected number of awards for this value varies with 
regard to the diversity measure. The values of the familiarity measure are chosen in or-
der to represent its distribution. This includes the lowest and highest value, the mean, 
and the mean +/– one standard deviation above and below the mean. The vertical line 
on the x-axis displays the mean of the diversity measure.
8 The regression models are shown in Table A2 in the appendix.
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The results of the interaction effects largely support H4: For familiarity scores above 
the mean, the expected number of awards generally increases with more diversity. For 
scores below the mean, the increase is either at a very moderate level or the expected 
count does not increase at all. Therefore, as predicted, the familiarity effect is generally 
stronger when it meets heterogeneous and diverse cultural and social structures. Vice 
versa, diversity has a greater effect on creativity and critical success if its creative poten-
tial is socially embedded within familiar social structures. If diverse structures are not 
socially embedded in familiar organizations – in other words, if directors operate with-
in teams with no team familiarity at all – then the effect on success is about zero (that 
is, the line in the diagram has a zero slope). The slope is even negative for new genre, 
team diversity, and degree of exploration. In this case, increasing diversity reduces the 
expected critical success. Diversity, while generally being a positive feature in the art 
world, can then become detrimental for creativity if it is not “bounded” in familiarity. 
5 Discussion and conclusion
This article analyzes the individual career patterns of an almost complete population of 
creative artists: directors of feature films. In line with prior research (Stark 2009; Uzzi/
Spiro 2005; de Vaan/Stark/Vedres 2013), the results suggest that familiar network struc-
tures and exposure to diverse creative conventions work as complementary elements 
in the creation of innovative ideas. Improving on existing research, however, this study 
shows that these features greatly affect individual careers as well. Career diversity maxi-
mizes the flow of different ideas, expands the creative palette, and broadens a director’s 
creative vision. Furthermore, this creative potential is boosted if it exists within trust-
enhancing familiar social ties that enable and optimize the coordination of creativity 
and information flow. 
The paper therefore adds to the literature on teams by showing that team composition 
matters not only for team success but also for individual careers. The findings dem-
onstrate that creativity and innovativeness – which I argue are reflected in the critical 
success of a director – depend on factors largely outside the individual’s ability and 
experience level, but are related to the specific social surroundings in which a director is 
embedded. Hence, the study suggests that critical recognition derives not only from the 
merit of individual talent, but is also affected by the specific “art world” (Becker 1982) 
or the social structures within the labor market that strengthen or weaken individual 
success. 
Talent and human capital certainly represent important factors in career success, and 
the study’s control variables demonstrate their significant effects. This paper shows, 
however, that contextual factors have their own effects whether creative artists gain crit-
ical attention or not. Ronald Burt is probably right to note that human capital points to 
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individual ability, but “social capital refers to opportunity” (Burt 1998: 7). Only within 
socially structured opportunities can individual ability bloom and achieve major suc-
cess, but without the right opportunities, talent alone will not be enough in a market 
like this. The paper therefore adds to the literature on explaining winner-take-all struc-
tures by pointing out that it is not only talent that matters: the structural positions that 
create opportunities for gifted individuals are equally important.
However, designing the right team, creating a good mixture between familiar and di-
verse social and cultural structures, and being in the “right” social positions are abili-
ties that might come from individual talent. Some people might have more talent to 
strategically create and attach themselves to those social structures that enable success. 
While there might be some truth in this, I believe that Katherine Giuffre is right when 
she concludes from her study that careers are not linear “ladders” on which one either 
moves up or down, but “sandpiles of opportunity” in which each individual’s career 
is structurally connected to all other career paths, and in which each career step, each 
move from project to project, changes the network and opportunity structure of every-
body else in the labor market (Giuffre 1999). It is in that sense that mere ability is not 
decisive for individual success, but also requires opportunities created through social 
structures of interconnected ties, affiliations, and prior collaborations. 
Despite the study’s effort to draw on as complete career data as possible, there are cer-
tain limitations. One limitation comes from that fact that the study draws solely on ca-
reer data from feature films, not from related fields, such as TV or theater productions, 
in which film directors might also engage. Hence, the study cannot estimate whether 
these missing data affect its results. However, if the assumption holds that the missing 
data generating process is “MCAR” – missing completely at random – then this omis-
sion is largely unproblematic (Little/Rubin 2002). In other words, if we assume that the 
mechanism that leads directors to seek TV and theater projects is uncorrelated with the 
study’s main variables, then the lack of data is negligible. I leave it to future research to 
decide whether this assumption holds or not, and whether the study’s results can be 
replicated within different artistic domains.
The findings of the study might be generalized beyond the specific labor market for film 
directors and be applied to other labor markets in which innovation, creativity, and/or 
critical recognition play a crucial role for generating reputation and career success, for 
instance, in the careers of journalists, musicians, designers, politicians, academics, man-
agers, or even professional sports players. Future research could test the study’s findings 
on these other areas and see whether or not the same effects apply.
The findings are also important on a much broader scale than the empirical setting 
might suggest. As Jones and DeFillippi note (1996), the project-based film industry is 
probably prototypical of what is to come: the economy has been shifting from a hier-
archical organization of labor to network and team-based production (Castells 1996). 
Careers are becoming “boundaryless” (Arthur/Rousseau 1996). Work is switching from 
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manual labor to creative and knowledge-driven project work (Boltanski/Chiapello 
2005). Hence, the 1900 to 2010 network structure of the film business probably offers a 
natural test laboratory for explaining outcomes in other sectors of the current twenty-
first century market economy.
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Appendix
Technical details on the construction of the study’s predictors 
 
Let � ≔ ����� � ��� the set of all film productions, where smaller indices correspond to 
earlier release dates. For �		�� ���� ≔ ����� � � ���� �	denotes the set of the �� individuals 
in film team � and � �� 	� �����	� � �1�� ��� is the set of all persons ever involved in a 
production. For �� �		�� ��		� is defined as 1 if ��� �� 	� 	���� and 0 otherwise, i.e. ��		� is 1 if 
and only if � and � collaborated in production �. For the sake of convenience, I also 
introduce the index set ���� ≔ ���� ��: �� � �		� � ��		�� � �		� � ���	. 
 








To give co-workings in smaller teams more weight, supposing that collaborators are more 
familiar with each other if they had collaborated in a smaller production as opposed to 
larger ones, each term of the sum is adjusted by ��� � 	1. 
 
For any individual �			�, I accumulate all ��		�’s over all �’s that are relevant for � up to 
production �: 








At the team level c, Cohesion is given by: 
Cohesion� �
� �1 � ���� ���� ����
2��� � 1�  
where q
c
 is the number of cliques (at least three individuals) within a current team c who 
collaborated at least once in a prior production. This yields a non-symmetric �� � ��-
matrix �� for each team c, within which each matrix element ����  is the ratio of the 
number of individuals occurring both in clique v and w to the cardinality �� of clique v. 
Analogously, �� is the total number of crew members in c. Accumulating all entries of �� 
over all �’s where � was involved yields an individual level measure that captures the 
cohesiveness of �’s career at each point in time t:  
 
Cohesion���� � � Cohesion��
���	 ⋀ 	����
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Genre diversity. At the team level, this measure computes the average distance between all 
members of a film crew, based on the genres of each team member’s prior productions. 
To build this variable, I use the full database consisting of a total of 1,650,006 individuals 
affiliated in 1,052,724 movie productions. This way I have access to the full genre histories 
of any team member located in the director dataset I use for the main analysis. Using 
these data, I first determine each team member’s genre background on the basis of the 28 
genre dummies in the database. For each team member in a current team, I accumulate 
the number of productions in each of the 28 genres with which a team member was 
affiliated during his/her career (prior to the current production). I repeat this procedure 
for all teams in the database. Then for each team �	�, I compute K-dimensional vectors 
��� � ����� � � � ���� �, where ����  is the fraction of crew member i’s genre history in genre 
category k. Based on Jaffe (1986), the genre distance d between a team member i and j is 
derived by: 
���� � 1 � �
∑ ���� ��������
�∑ ���� ����� �
�




����  ranges between zero and one. Zero means that both genre backgrounds between 
members i and j are exactly the same. Value one means that i and j share the maximum 
possible difference in their respective genre histories, i.e. they have never worked in the 
same genre. The genre diversity index of r at time t, then, is the total of all ���� ’s, adjusted 
for crewsize ��, and accumulated over all � of a person’s career path up to the current 
project at time t. 
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Additional tables
Table A1 List of film awards
Awards USA International “A“ festivals International “B“ festivals
Academy Awards Berlin International  
Film Festival
European Film Awards
Broadcast Film Critics  
Association Awards
Cairo International  
Film Festival
German Film Awards
Directors Guild of  
America Awards
Cannes Film Festival Ghent International  
Film Festival
Golden Globe Awards International Film  
Festival of India
London Critics Circle  
Film Awards
Independent Spirit Awards Karlovy Vary International  
Film Festival
London Film Festival
Laurel Awards Locarno International 
Film Festival
Miami International  
Film Festival
Los Angeles Film Critics  
Association Awards
Mar del Plata  
Film Festival
Monaco International  
Film Festival
MTV Movie Awards Montreal World  
Film Festival
Moondance International  
Film Festival
National Board of  
Review Awards
Moscow International  
Film Festival
Norwegian International  
Film Festival
National Society of Film  
Critics Awards
San Sebastian International 
Film Festival
Sarajevo Film Festival
New York Film Critics  
Circle Awards
Shanghai International  
Film Festival
Seattle International  
Film Festival
People‘s Choice Awards Tokyo International  
Film Festival
Thessaloniki Film Festival
Screen Actors Guild Awards Venice Film Festival Toronto International  
Film Festival
Writers Guild of 
America Awards
Warsaw International  
Film Festival
Undine Awards, Austria
Vienna International  
Film Festival
Zurich Film Festival 
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Table A2 Count regressions including interaction effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Familiarity (ln) –0.290* –0.769* –0.628* –0.532*
(–22.489) (–42.402) (–40.156) (–37.068)
Cohesion (ln) –0.019 0.011 0.003 0.017
(–2.599) (1.460) (0.353) (2.261)
Vertical strong ties (ln) –0.053* –0.059* –0.059* –0.059*
(–10.443) (–11.486) (–11.615) (–11.696)
Horizontal strong ties (ln) 0.046* 0.052* 0.046* 0.053*
(11.375) (12.902) (11.311) (12.928)
Degree of exploration (ln) –0.306* –0.130* –0.172* –0.129*
(–21.483) (–9.734) (–12.869) (–9.709)
Genre spanning (ln) 0.621* 0.589* 0.727* 0.659*
(35.978) (34.226) (41.708) (38.033)
New genre (ln) 0.251* 0.219* –0.088* 0.234*
(17.412) (15.140) (–5.480) (16.187)
Genre diversity (ln) 0.447* 0.294* 0.422* 0.163*
(17.912) (11.350) (17.100) (6.225)
Age (ln) 0.241* 0.234* 0.243* 0.239*
(21.415) (20.758) (21.615) (21.169)
Female 0.473* 0.430* 0.448* 0.436*
(19.792) (17.967) (18.712) (18.182)
Origin USA –0.199* –0.166* –0.174* –0.156*
(–11.717) (–9.764) (–10.181) (–9.145)
Origin UK –0.148 –0.147 –0.130 –0.136
(–3.217) (–3.276) (–2.856) (–3.020)
Origin Germany 0.510* 0.538* 0.542* 0.536*
(9.186) (9.576) (9.665) (9.535)
Origin France 0.015 –0.099 –0.040 –0.066
(0.312) (–2.124) (–0.856) (–1.419)
Origin Italy 1.097* 1.047* 1.078* 1.055*
(14.674) (13.999) (14.227) (14.120)
Prior success (ln) 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025*
(38.031) (38.280) (38.002) (38.379)
Years in business (ln) 0.227* 0.219* 0.223* 0.215*
(67.933) (65.101) (67.251) (63.982)
General job experience (ln) –0.705* –0.610* –0.599* –0.612*
(–29.669) (–25.381) (–25.451) (–25.793)
Has been producer (ln) –0.009 –0.013* 0.003 –0.013*
(–2.553) (–3.808) (0.943) (–3.755)
Has been actor (ln) –0.043* –0.029* –0.043* –0.033*
(–8.397) (–5.670) (–8.308) (–6.327)
Has been writer (ln) 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.008
(2.207) (2.765) (2.961) (1.961)
International visibility (ln) 0.402* 0.397* 0.399* 0.399*
(73.601) (72.836) (73.100) (73.117)
Major titles (ln) 0.057* 0.078* 0.063* 0.079*
(6.382) (8.782) (7.151) (8.928)
Sequels (ln) –0.039* –0.042* –0.063* –0.044*
(–9.923) (–10.774) (–15.807) (–11.147)
Novels (ln) 0.259* 0.270* 0.232* 0.265*
(46.023) (48.102) (41.058) (47.263)
Titles in English (ln) 0.049* –0.001 0.033* 0.008
(4.912) (–0.088) (3.365) (0.816)
Titles in Spanish (ln) –0.061* –0.061* –0.068* –0.059*
(–13.444) (–13.427) (–15.087) (–12.975)
Titles in German (ln) –0.080* –0.083* –0.092* –0.083*
(–17.141) (–17.621) (–19.472) (–17.688)
Titles in French (ln) 0.064* 0.070* 0.059* 0.072*
(12.645) (13.920) (11.762) (14.262)
Titles in Italian (ln) –0.029* –0.024* –0.033* –0.026*
 (–5.519) (–4.645) (–6.372) (–5.037)
(continued on next page)
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Production country USA (ln) 0.104* 0.112* 0.116* 0.120*
(14.193) (15.159) (15.674) (16.108)
Production country Germany (ln) –0.139* –0.126* –0.128* –0.124*
(–37.573) (–33.951) (–34.603) (–33.516)
Production country France (ln) –0.130* –0.115* –0.114* –0.114*
(–25.901) (–22.816) (–22.483) (–22.614)
Production country Italy (ln) –0.074* –0.058* –0.059* –0.060*
(–14.394) (–11.306) (–11.487) (–11.617)
Crew size (ln) 0.033* 0.034* 0.033* 0.033*
(16.809) (17.040) (16.769) (16.489)
Team human capital (ln) –0.256* –0.245* –0.246* –0.247*
(–90.419) (–86.340) (–86.892) (–87.152)
Team star power (ln) 0.321* 0.313* 0.311* 0.313*
(141.848) (137.212) (136.454) (137.740)
Hierarchical layer structure (ln) –0.028* –0.024* –0.024* –0.024*
(–11.806) (–10.226) (–10.408) (–10.075)
Time (ln) 0.057* 0.048* 0.054* 0.046*
(22.803) (19.052) (21.429) (18.230)








Constant –1.928* –1.888* –1.858* –1.991*
(–40.722) (–39.748) (–39.526) (–41.844)
Ln(r) 0.069* 0.074* 0.077* 0.076*
(5.072) (5.412) (5.652) (5.542)
Ln(s) –2.061* –2.073* –2.081* –2.076*
(–134.340) (–135.102) (–136.097) (–135.413)
Genre dummies yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood –443523.516 –442784.995 –442833.334 –442650.397
Chi2 422760.200 419346.440 424025.217 419313.889
AIC 887189.033 885711.989 885808.668 885442.795
BIC 887975.653 886498.610 886595.288 886229.415
N (directors) 55097 55097 55097 55097
N (engagements) 478859 478859 478859 478859
Notes: Random-effects negative binomial regressions; t statistics in parentheses;  
* p < 0.001 (two-sided tests); ln=logged variables.
Table A2 (continued)
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